Operation Newgreen
Detective Chief Superintendent David Knopwood
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1. Foreword by Assistant Chief Constable Ingrid Lee

West Yorkshire Police publish this report to the public to show the open and transparent nature of its review and demonstrate our continuing commitment to protecting the public and building trust and confidence in the communities of West Yorkshire. Using the Savile case as a watershed it is crucial that those victims whose voices have not been heard in the past are now offered the utmost care and that future victims, irrespective of the perpetrator, do not feel afraid to come forward. The support available to victims, not just from the police, but from other agencies, has never been greater. Working with partner agencies, the Force continues to be committed to ensuring the victims of Savile’s crimes are fully supported and that other victims of abuse - past, present or future can come forward to WYP in confidence.

On 5th October 2012 Operation Yewtree was established by the Metropolitan Police Service to investigate allegations of sexual abuse committed by the late Sir James Savile. Since that date, West Yorkshire Police (WYP) has worked with Operation Yewtree to investigate these allegations and support the victims of Savile’s abuse.

On 7th November 2012 the Home Secretary commissioned Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) to conduct a review to assess the police knowledge of and response to the historical allegations made against Savile and related individuals between 1964 and 2012. West Yorkshire Police fully cooperated with that review, which resulted in the publication of the HMIC report “Mistakes were made”.

In line with that report and comments from the Crown Prosecution Service, WYP has considered how best to consider the status of the allegations of those who have reported them. On the basis of recent assessments, there appears to be a general acceptance that Savile was a prolific sex offender and a paedophile, but he was never convicted of any offence during his lifetime. Although mindful of that fact, we have nevertheless taken the decision to refer to his “crimes” and “offending” rather than his “alleged
crimes” and “alleged offending” in this report. We recognise that the allegations made against Savile have not been and never will be tested in a criminal law court. However, the substantial number of victims who have come forward, apparently unknown to one another for the most part, is an indication of a pattern of criminal behaviour by Savile that overwhelmingly suggests, if alive, he would have many cases to answer.

There are currently 76 crimes involving 68 victims committed in the West Yorkshire area relating to Savile. None of these cases were previously reported to WYP prior to Savile's death. It is a stark and shocking fact that there are over 214 crimes nationally relating to Savile with only five coming to light during Savile's lifetime. There is no doubt that police forces made mistakes in relation to sharing and keeping information relating to Savile so no single clear picture of his offending could be made. As Savile’s home police force, WYP would have been the obvious place to collect all such information, but investigation has shown that much of the available information during Savile’s lifetime was never shared with WYP and when it was WYP, did not connect the events to recognise a potential pattern of offending. We must do everything we can to understand why that was, to ensure it does not happen again.

Whilst victim care remains the focus, the investigation and review by West Yorkshire Police has also examined in detail the relationship WYP had with Savile.

To conduct this investigation, Operation Newgreen was established comprising of a dedicated investigation team, to review all past contact between WYP and Savile. Each matter identified through this process has been investigated in detail to provide a thorough understanding of each.

It is important for the public to know the scale and nature of West Yorkshire Police officers’ involvement with Savile during his lifetime and to that end WYP has committed resources to finding that out, to search for the truth, to separate myth and rumour from fact. There is no doubt that the passage of
time has presented some huge challenges for the investigation team and unfortunately this means that there are some aspects that cannot be answered. However, in making public the report of the Operation Newgreen investigation, WYP has sought to provide answers and reassurance to the wider community, including the lessons to be learned to prevent this happening again.

WYP has been committed to making public the results and findings of this review and to passing on the detail to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC).

The parameters for Operation Newgreen meant that information regarding Savile was sought from every serving police officer and police staff member, including where possible, those that have retired from the Force, to better understand Savile, his offending and the involvement WYP had with him.

When taken in context, Savile lived for over 80 years as an individual who has duped millions into believing that he was a genuine celebrity, a charity fundraiser and a harmless eccentric who did nothing but good in our communities. However, evidence now suggests that he was a predatory paedophile and manipulative liar who caused harm to so many.

It is clear that many people felt unable to report these dreadful crimes to West Yorkshire Police or to one of the many agencies specially trained to independently receive such complaints. It is also clear that Savile's celebrity status and victims' fear of not being believed because of his standing within the community as a high profile and successful individual, was a barrier to reporting. WYP is committed to fully understanding this, removing such barriers and continuing to learn wider lessons from the experience.

WYP has made real progress over the years in how it tackles sexual abuse. It has a dedicated rape investigation team, multi agency district teams supporting victims and investigating sexual abuse, specially trained officers to
tackle sexual violence and officers dedicated to, and highly skilled in, the investigation of child abuse.

WYP welcomes the recent commissioning of the NSPCC to further examine why victims do not report, having already learned so much from agencies including Barnardos and the NSPCC in relation to child sexual exploitation. This is an important piece of work that can only bring further learning to the Police and other organisations.

WYP also welcome the consideration of mandatory reporting by those who in the course of their professional duties become aware of sexual abuse. WYP is encouraged by the significant step change in the reporting of recent and non-recent sexual abuse since the Savile case emerged, which gives confidence that people will come forward despite the mistakes that have been made. WYP will continue to work hard with our partners to support those victims and prosecute the offenders.

We must continue to work hard to give victims a voice, to build their confidence to tell someone and more importantly when they do come forward, ensure that something is done about it.

Much good work has been undertaken to help WYP to develop and improve its services. We all must be vigilant. It is not something that can be done alone; it requires a significant team and community effort to widen our circle of protection, to give people a voice, to challenge the unthinkable and report what it is they see, what it is they suspect, to enable the child protection community to investigate and protect people from such dreadful harm.

We will never know the totality of Savile’s offending but we must never allow this to happen again.

Ingrid Lee
Assistant Chief Constable
2. Introduction

2.1 This report was commissioned by Assistant Chief Constable Ingrid Lee and is authored by Detective Chief Superintendent David Knopwood.

2.2 Sir James Savile lived the majority of his life in West Yorkshire in the city of Leeds and this justifies a particular focus for the scrutiny within the Force.

2.3 This report will detail the findings of a comprehensive review (Operation Newgreen\(^1\)) by West Yorkshire Police (WYP) regarding the Force’s relationship with the late Sir James Savile. The report focuses on all identified instances where WYP has interacted with Savile and examines whether there has been any impropriety by any member of WYP, the lessons to be learned and how current practices address areas of concern.

2.4 In addition, the report will identify and explain all WYP contacts with other agencies and police forces linked to Savile, in particular the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), Surrey Police (SP) and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC).

2.5 Operation Newgreen has been detailed and thorough and conducted in such a way as to encourage both current and former employees of WYP to come forward, either in person or anonymously, and provide any information they may have relating to Savile.

2.6 In addition, information has been sought from members of the public either directly or through a third party. However, it is important to note that in relation to Savile, the information received by Operation Newgreen spans seven decades. As a consequence, despite painstaking efforts by the team to explore the information, some of it remains sketchy and vague due to the passing of time, legitimate weeding of information and the fact those who may have been able to provide an answer have since passed away.

\(^1\) Operation Newgreen – WYP review of its contact with Savile.
2.7 It is clear that the victims of Savile’s crimes did not have the confidence to come forward and report offences to WYP during his lifetime. From experience we know that disclosure of sexual abuse is extremely difficult and distressing and victims have to deal with a multitude of painful and complex feelings that at times prevent the abuse being reported to anyone. In publishing this report, WYP want to show its total commitment to helping past, present and future victims of sexual abuse to take that first step.

2.8 WYP welcomes the commissioning of the NSPCC to further examine why victims do not report allegations of sexual abuse.

2.9 This report provides information regarding Savile’s involvement with crime prevention campaigns organised by WYP and the reasons why he was asked to participate. It includes other formal links that Savile had with WYP and again explains the reasons for them. These contacts date back many decades and in some instances only limited information has been available.

2.10 A key part of the review has been to fully explore the circumstances surrounding what has been described as the “Friday Morning Club” (FMC) - the name attributed to occasions when Savile met at his home address in Leeds with a regular group of people, including police officers. Many serving and retired police officers have been spoken to regarding this, as have many of Savile’s friends and associates.

2.11 WYP has thoroughly investigated the FMC and no evidence was found of any impropriety or misconduct on behalf of the officers who attended. The details of the investigation are detailed in section 8 of this report.

2.12 During their review, HMIC identified a number of issues concerning WYP which were raised with the Force and subsequently contained within the HMIC report “Mistakes were made”. A response to the issues detailed below forms a significant part of this report.
2.13 The specific points raised by HMIC with WYP were:

- Details of senior officer overview of the Savile internal enquiry;
- Terms of reference for Operation Newgreen and associated policy decisions;
- Knowledge of an intelligence report sent to WYP by the MPS in 1998;
- Absence of information and intelligence on WYP systems relating to Savile in the light of his level of offending;
- Information received that WYP officers had been directed to patrol near to Savile’s home address in Leeds;
- Knowledge of an intelligence report sent to WYP from MPS in 1964;
- Savile’s involvement in the Yorkshire Ripper enquiry;
- Management of media reports relating to Savile;
- Process to obtain any relevant information on Savile from current officers and police staff.

In light of these issues, HMIC were determined to understand the relationship between WYP and Savile. These various issues have been the subject of detailed investigation by WYP. In each instance an account of the circumstances is provided later in this report, together with an explanation as to how the intelligence was processed.

2.14 It has been identified that there were gaps in WYP’s knowledge regarding some pieces of intelligence as the Force does not have a record of receiving it or the action taken.

2.15 A breakdown of what is known of Savile’s offending is provided in Appendix A, including the number of offences, the type of offence and a profile of his victims. At the time of writing this report, WYP has identified 68 victims within the WYP area.
2.16 Since the commencement of Operation Yewtree\(^2\) a vast amount of information has been forwarded to the MPS from the public and police regarding Savile. Some of this intelligence has been provided by former police officers and dates back over 40 years. This has posed significant problems for the review team as at times it has been impossible to confirm the origins or corroborate the content of evidence, but it is included in this report for completeness.

2.17 As this review has progressed, a clear picture has emerged as to how WYP systems and processes around the management, dissemination and actioning of intelligence and information have developed over the years. This has assisted the review team in identifying areas for improvement in respect of current working practices and making the recommendations for change that are detailed later in this report.

2.18 WYP is already actively engaged in ensuring that the lessons learned as a result of this review are fully actioned.

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\(^2\) Operation Yewtree: Metropolitan Police Service investigation into sexual allegations made against Jimmy Savile.
3. Background

3.1 Since the extent of Savile’s appalling crimes became public in October 2012, the main focus for WYP has been to encourage his victims to come forward and then to work with our partners in Victim Support and NAPAC\(^3\) to provide them with the support they need.

3.2 Savile’s victims live across all areas of the UK and therefore it was agreed at a national level that the MPS would take primacy for any investigations under Operation Yewtree. Recognising the need to coordinate the police response, in October 2012 senior officers from WYP visited the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) for Operation Yewtree. It was agreed how both forces would work together to provide the best support for victims, ensure each allegation was robustly investigated and take positive action to deal with any additional suspects that were identified. Since that time WYP officers, who are experienced in dealing with victims of non-recent child abuse, have worked with Operation Yewtree and other forces in both supporting victims and gathering evidence. The Force has worked within the terms outlined by Operation Yewtree.

3.3 As of 3\(^{rd}\) May 2013, WYP have received 116 reports from members of the public relating to Jimmy Savile. Of these 116 reports, 76 crimes involving 68 victims have been recorded as having been committed in West Yorkshire, including offences of sexual assault and rape. A more detailed breakdown of his offending is contained within Appendix A of this report.

3.4 At the end of October 2012, the existence of the FMC was widely reported in the media. It was reported that both serving and retired police officers had, over a number of years, regularly visited Savile at his home address in Roundhay, Leeds.

\(^3\) National Association for People Abused in Childhood
3.5 An initial review was conducted that confirmed officers had attended Savile’s home on Friday mornings as part of their neighbourhood patrols, which involved engaging with members of the local community. It was also identified that other officers had visited Savile’s home whilst off duty. At that time Savile was a national celebrity who had received a Knighthood for charitable services in 1990 and was regularly in the company of high profile public figures and dignitaries. Officers described the meetings as starting in the 1990’s and being ‘infrequent’ due to Savile spending a lot of his time travelling the country as part of his charity fundraising work. When Savile was resident in Leeds, the meetings would take place and consisted of Savile and his friends sitting drinking tea and discussing current events. Further details of these interactions are contained within section 8 of this report.

During this period, police officers were actively encouraged to establish links within their community with key individuals as a way of engaging with the community. Some of these became regular “coffee spots” where officers would stop and chat in order to keep up to date with community issues.

3.6 On the 9th November 2012 WYP received a letter from HMIC outlining the aims of their investigation and requesting all intelligence and information held in relation to Savile be forwarded to them.

3.7 WYP complied with this request and provided details of one crime report, regarding the theft of Savile’s spectacles; an intelligence report from Surrey Police in 2009 concerning their investigation into Duncroft School; and Savile’s death report from 2011. Subsequent checks conducted by Operation Newgreen identified a further four crime reports (with Savile as a victim) and a communication log relating to a friend of Savile. None of the additional reports relate to Savile committing any offences. It was established that the failure to locate these reports on the first occasion was due to poor searching procedures of the WYP computer systems.
3.8 In November 2012 Surrey Police provided information to WYP regarding email and telephone contact that had taken place between the two forces in 2008 and 2009.

The contact related to three points:

1. That Surrey Police were investigating allegations made against Savile by victims who had attended Duncroft School in the 1970’s;

2. That Surrey Police had contacted WYP in 2008 requesting information WYP held on their intelligence systems relating to Savile. The contact was also to inform WYP of their intention to interview Savile regarding Duncroft School;

3. That in 2009 a WYP Inspector (now retired) had contacted Surrey Police on Savile’s behalf in order to facilitate an interview between Savile and Surrey Police, as Savile had lost the details of the officer who wanted to interview him.

3.9 It was confirmed that WYP had received, dealt with and retained the information on all of the above three points. Further, in relation to point 3 it was established that a retired Police Inspector, Insp (A)⁴, who had contacted Surrey Police on behalf of Savile, had been spoken to by his supervisor and given words of advice regarding his contact with Surrey in line with existing force policy.

3.10 In December 2012 the initial review of the FMC was concluded and a report was submitted to HMIC on 18th December 2012. No evidence of impropriety by the officers who had attended Savile’s home address was found.

⁴ The incident involving Insp (A) is referred to in the Surrey police report into Operation Ornament. In that report Insp (A) is referred to as Insp (5).
3.11 In January 2013 Surrey Police provided information from the interview they had conducted with Savile in 2009 when investigating sexual abuse allegations at Duncroft School. During this interview, Savile said that he would pass what he described as “weirdo” letters he received at his home address, to the police officers who attended the FMC. He went on to explain how the officers would take them away and deal with them. Surrey Police did not pass this information onto WYP until January 2013 and on checking WYP systems no record of such letters could be found.

3.12 In January 2013, following receipt of this information from Surrey Police, WYP launched Operation Newgreen - a far reaching and detailed enquiry into all links between Savile and WYP.

3.13 Operation Newgreen commenced on the 21st January 2013 with the following objectives:

- To gain a wider understanding of the relationship between WYP and Jimmy Savile;
- To identify any other allegations that may or may not have been made about Savile to WYP;
- Establish the membership and purpose of the Friday Morning Club;
- Establish the conduct of attendees at the Club.

3.14 On 8th February 2013 WYP received a visit from HMIC in relation to their national review of police involvement into non-recent sexual allegations against Jimmy Savile. HMIC provided information that had not been previously shared with WYP and asked the Force to respond to the following points:

- Details of senior officer overview of the Savile internal enquiry;
- Terms of reference for Operation Newgreen and associated policy decisions;
• Knowledge of an intelligence report sent to WYP by the MPS in 1998;
• Absence of information and intelligence on WYP systems relating to Savile in the light of his level of offending;
• Information received that WYP officers had been directed to patrol near to Savile’s home address in Leeds;
• Knowledge of an intelligence report sent to WYP from MPS in 1964;
• Savile’s involvement in the Yorkshire Ripper enquiry;
• Management of media reports relating to Savile;
• Process to obtain any relevant information on Savile from current officers and police staff.

3.15 On 13th February West Yorkshire Police received a letter from the IPCC requesting that West Yorkshire Police record as a conduct matter the actions of a retired WYP Inspector (Insp A) in contacting Surrey Police on behalf of Jimmy Savile. They also requested that the matter be referred to the IPCC. In addition, they asked that WYP review all relevant material and information relating to Savile to establish whether there were any other matters which ought to be recorded and referred to them, either mandatorily or voluntarily.

3.16 On 15th February 2013 West Yorkshire Police complied with the IPCC request, recording and referring the conduct matter in relation to Inspector A to the IPCC.

3.17 The Operation Newgreen review has not only provided answers to each of the points raised by HMIC, but has thoroughly investigated each matter to identify and secure information relating to Savile in order to fully understand the relationship between Savile and WYP spanning seven decades. This report deals with the issues raised that relate to WYP only and the review team has taken great care not to conflict with other areas that have been, or are currently, being investigated by other agencies or Forces.
4. Jimmy Savile’s Relationship with West Yorkshire Police

4.1 The use of celebrities to support crime prevention campaigns is common place in the police service, as they can generate greater engagement with the public and create improved media interest in the campaign. It is essential that there is an effective process surrounding the engagement of celebrity support for campaigns, which clearly manages the expectations of both parties. Any failings on either side could seriously undermine the trust the public have in the police.

4.2 As a result of the WYP request to seek further information from its current and former employees, the review team spoke to a retired Senior Officer. He told officers from Operation Newgreen that he was encouraged by the then Chief Constable to hold lunches with local dignitaries in an effort to improve the image of WYP. This would have been approximately 1983. These lunches were held monthly at Millgarth police station in Leeds, with a cooked lunch being served to a group consisting of six senior officers and six invited high profile local people. He stated that his guests included the Bishop of Leeds, the regional head of British Telecom, Judges, barristers, local heads of business, and on one occasion Jimmy Savile. The retired officer stated that Savile `held court` and dominated conversations. As a result Savile was not asked to attend further lunches.

4.3 In 1995 Savile was invited by Killingbeck Sports and Social Club⁵ to open a climbing wall that was erected in the gymnasium at Killingbeck Police Station. The wall was to be used by police employees and their families as well as local scout and guide groups. Savile donated £500 towards its construction but the opening event was the only time that he visited the Climbing Wall. A plaque commemorating his opening of the wall has been removed from the wall following the allegations of sexual abuse coming to light during the ITV “Exposure” documentary.

⁵ Killingbeck Sports and Social Club – a member funded organisation to provide recreational facilities and events for police employees and their families.
4.4 In the past, members of the WYP Officers Mess\(^6\) would arrange dinner events that were funded by current and retired officers and often invite an external guest speaker to provide a personal view on issues linked to policing. In March 1998, Savile was invited to attend one of the evenings and he gave a speech on his business interests in Northern Ireland and his upbringing in Leeds. He also spoke about how he felt policing had changed since his youth. He did not receive any payment for attending the evening but he was provided with transport home by one of the Assistant Chief Constables (now retired). It should be noted that it would not be unusual for a visiting guest speaker to be transported to and from the event by a member of WYP.

4.5 Savile made financial contributions to a number of charitable causes linked to WYP, an example being the fund started after the tragic murder of PC Ian Broadhurst in 2003 to which he donated approximately £1000\(^7\).

4.6 Due to the location of Savile’s home in Roundhay Park and the elevated view from the balcony across the grounds, Savile offered WYP the opportunity to use it when policing major events in the park. An example of this was the Robbie Williams concert in 2006 which was attended by approximately 90,000 people. This offer was not taken up by the police on this or any other occasion.

4.7 In 2008 Savile attended an ‘open day’ at the Force’s Operational Support Service Department (OSSD)\(^8\). This event was organised for the families of police officers and staff to gain an understanding of the work undertaken by OSSD. Savile did not attend in any official capacity but was invited as a friend of a serving police officer and did not fulfil any official role.

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\(^6\) WYP Officers Mess—a police social collective that organised and self funded social events.

\(^7\) Upon finalisation of the Ian Broadhurst fund, the donations log book was weeded and destroyed, so it is not possible to confirm the exact donation amount.

\(^8\) OSSD – WYP central repository for specialist services e.g. Dogs, Mounted Police, Helicopter
4.8 In 2008, in conjunction with Leeds District Community Safety Partnership (LDCSP), WYP ran a campaign called ‘Hand in a Handler’ that was designed to encourage the public to provide the police with information regarding any individual who was receiving stolen property. The decision was to use a local celebrity to endorse the campaign to enhance its media appeal. WYP considered approaching a number of local Yorkshire celebrities. However, as Savile was available and lived relatively close by, the decision was made to enlist his services. His role was to be involved in the media launch of the campaign and be included in media opportunities. This involved photographs of Savile and the officers who organised the campaign appearing in the local papers, with an accompanying text explaining the campaign.

4.9 Alongside the “Hand in a Handler” campaign, Savile was invited by the LDCSP to be involved in the ‘Talking Signs’ campaign. This involved a recording of Savile’s voice being broadcast through speakers attached to lamp posts giving local students and resident’s crime prevention advice. Savile did not receive payment for any support he provided to this or any other WYP campaigns.

4.10 On 9th November 2011 Savile’s funeral mass took place at the Leeds Cathedral, (St Anne’s Cathedral), Cookridge Street, Leeds. The ceremony was conducted by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Leeds, the Rt Reverend Arthur Roche. Approximately 700 people attended the event consisting of family, friends, local and national dignitaries together with television and entertainment celebrities. Due to the significant impact on the local road networks and businesses, WYP provided a total of 14 officers and police staff to assist with crowd control and support the Council Highways Department.

4.11 This review has found that there are lessons to be learned for WYP in the way it secured the services of Savile to support its work. The relationship with Savile and WYP appears to have its foundations based on his friendship with a serving officer, and this was the medium that was utilised in most

\[LDCSP \text{ – a multi agency public, private and voluntary partnership focused on reducing crime and disorder}\]
instances to secure Savile’s services. The effect of this was that arrangements with Savile were made on a local, often informal basis rather than corporately through a dedicated media channel.

4.12 With the benefit of hindsight, there are also lessons to be learned for WYP in developing a relationship with Savile. WYP would have benefited from having a formal policy to facilitate engagement between the police and high profile individuals, having a proper recording procedure in place relating to that engagement and then ensuring that those relationships were monitored. Savile’s’ celebrity status spanned many decades and he was seen by the public as a man who ‘did good’. He was able to manage his public persona in such a way that he deceived most people he met. He was a manipulative man who exploited to the worst possible degree the trust people placed in him. This is little consolation to his victims and WYP accept there are lessons that must be learned and implemented quickly.
5. Identified Victims of Savile’s Abuse.

5.1 On 3rd October 2012, ITV broadcasted a documentary entitled ‘Exposure’ in which a number of allegations were made against Jimmy Savile regarding child abuse offences.

5.2 In anticipation of further victims coming forward as a result of the programme, WYP ensured that specially trained officers who were experienced in dealing with non–recent child abuse were available to provide support and advice.

5.3 The instruction from Mr. Peter Davies, ACPO10 Lead and Chief Executive for Child Protection and Abuse Investigation and head of CEOP11, was to collate the allegations in relation to Savile and submit them to CEOP via the regional point of contact in South Yorkshire Police (SYP), ensuring victims were sign posted to the NSPCC12. Mr. Davies was to review the national picture later that week to establish the best way of investigating any disclosures made.

5.4 On 4th October Mr Davies sent further instruction to all forces that following an initial assessment of a number of allegations, a decision had been made to appoint the MPS as the lead force to manage the police and child protection response across the UK. Forces were instructed to continue to collect and report allegations through to CEOP via their Regional Force Leads.

5.5 On Tuesday 9th October 2012 the MPS set out their intention to contact each victim and obtain the details of their allegation.

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10 ACPO – The Association of Chief Police Officers
11 Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre
12 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
5.6 Operation Yewtree (MPS) was established to undertake this process and the enquiry was to be conducted by the Special Case Team within the MPS Child Protection Command.

5.7 In order to enable the Operation Yewtree enquiry team to assess and contact each victim that had come forward, forces were requested to record information from the victims and submit a brief account to Operation Yewtree containing the following information:

- The victim/caller’s details;
- Approximate year of the offence/s;
- Location of the offence;
- Nature of the offence.

5.8 Over and above what was requested to be done by Operation Yewtree, WYP made the decision at the outset that in addition to recording this information, a specially trained officer would visit the victim or caller, secure any available evidence and direct them to support agencies including Victim Support, NSPCC and NAPAC. This ensured that each victim was given the best possible service at the earliest opportunity and that their allegation was being taken seriously. Co-ordination of all these allegations was done by a WYP Detective Inspector experienced in the investigation of child abuse.

5.9 On 7th November 2012 the MPS informed forces that due to the volume of referrals being made into Operation Yewtree, investigations with no specific London focus were to be allocated for local investigation to the relevant force. All allegations and information reports were still to have the initial contact and assessment as outlined at 5.7, and then be entered onto the HOLMES\textsuperscript{13} system by Operation Yewtree. The instruction specified that forces should remain in contact with Operation Yewtree to ensure that the WYP Senior Investigating Officer’s decisions complied with the nationally agreed investigation policy set by Operation Yewtree.

\textsuperscript{13} Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
5.10 This was necessary in order to ensure everything was captured in a single location and that relevant new information was shared between forces. Understandably, this created slight delays between the referral into Yewtree and the return of the allegation to the local force for any further action.

5.11 As investigations were now going to be returned to WYP for action, the senior officer responsible for Child Protection in WYP attended the MPS for a formal briefing in relation to the Operation Yewtree investigation policy and to enable the hand over of the crimes and information under investigation.

5.12 WYP then made the policy decision that all returned allegations with lines of investigation or further victim care requirements would be led by the Leeds Safeguarding Unit. This is the largest safeguarding team in West Yorkshire headed by a Detective Inspector experienced in child protection investigations.

5.13 The unit has a proven track record for investigatory excellence and also has well established links with third sector agencies in relation to the care and support of victims.

5.14 By 3rd May 2013 WYP had received 116 separate pieces of information regarding Savile, from the public and their own staff, that were all referred to Operation Yewtree.

5.15 A total of 76 crimes are currently recorded in West Yorkshire with some victims being complainants in multiple crime reports. These crimes have been created from both the 116 pieces of information received into WYP and all the information received into Operation Yewtree.

5.16 Appendix A provides a detailed breakdown of the crimes recorded and the victim profile.
6 Operation Newgreen

6.1 Operation Newgreen commenced on the 21st January 2013, under the command of a Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) reporting directly to the WYP Senior Command Team. Its main aim was to gain an understanding of the relationship and interaction between serving and retired police officers and the late Jimmy Savile; and to build on the initial report completed in December 2012 into those officers who had attended the FMC at Savile’s home.

6.2 Due to the serious nature of the review and volume of information and enquiries to process, HOLMES\textsuperscript{14} was used to manage the investigation. This system ensures that a large volume of information can be received, reviewed and acted upon and is used in the investigation of homicide and other large major enquiries.

6.3 The investigators attached to the enquiry were all experienced in serious and complex criminal investigations.

6.4 The review team had access to all records held by WYP and the authority to speak to anyone including members of the public, partner agencies and any officer or member of staff, retired or still serving who might have information relating to Savile and WYP.

6.5 The SIO reported directly to a member of WYP Senior Command Team through a Gold Group\textsuperscript{15} structure that was created specifically to ensure the team focussed on the strategic aims of the review.

\textsuperscript{14} Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
\textsuperscript{15} Gold Group – A Strategic Management Board comprising Senior Staff.
6.6 The structure of the review team is as follows:

**Senior Investigating Officer (SIO)** – Detective Superintendent  
**Deputy SIO** - Detective Chief Inspector  
**Action/Office Manager** – Detective Sergeant  
**External Enquiry Lead** – Detective Sergeant  
**Investigation Team** – 14 x Detective Constables  
**HOLMES team** – 1 x Index Officer, 1 x Investigative Support Officer  
**Intelligence Single Point of Contact (SPOC)** - Detective Inspector  
**Research officer**  
**Analyst**  
**Professional Standards Department lead** - Chief Superintendent  
**Media officer lead** – Corporate Communications Manager  
**Safeguarding lead** – Detective Inspector  
**Operation Yewtree nominated liaison officer** – Detective Inspector

6.7 On the 8th February 2013, following the sharing of information from HMIC that had not previously been seen by the Force, WYP amended the terms of reference for Operation Newgreen to encompass new information that had been collected by HMIC during their national review of police involvement with Savile.

6.8 The additional terms of reference included:

- WYP’s knowledge of intelligence held by MPS concerning Savile from 1964, 1998 and 2003;
- A fresh request for information from retired and serving WYP employees. As there had already been a national request for information from the public, police and partners by Operation Yewtree

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16 This report relates to the investigation of Savile by Surrey Police between 2007 -2009
that had been extensively covered in the media, it was decided that this further request for information would focus on WYP employees.

6.9 In addition, at this time a decision was made to include information relating to Savile being a `person of interest` to the ‘Yorkshire Ripper’ enquiry in the 1970`s.

6.10 Since the commencement of Operation Newgreen, the team has spent considerable time investigating all possible contacts, intelligence and issues regarding Savile and his links to WYP. The team has spoken to over 200 people and examined in detail the information that has been provided. This has led to 400 enquiries being conducted, over the course of 3000 working hours and with officers conducting enquiries across the United Kingdom and Ireland.
7 Intelligence and information regarding Savile.

‘Effective policing depends on efficient information management.’

7.1 The way in which Police forces and other law enforcement agencies manage information and intelligence has changed significantly over the past 30 years. Often this has been the result of lessons learned in the wake of a tragic event such as the murders committed by Peter Sutcliffe and the murder of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in 2002 by Ian Huntley. However, other changes have been brought about by significant developments in technology and the re-structuring of police forces.

7.2 The structure of WYP during the 1960’s, 1970’s, and to an extent the 1980’s, was completely different to the way it looks today. In 1964 policing in Yorkshire was based on the borough system consisting of 10 forces namely Barnsley, Dewsbury, Doncaster, Halifax, Huddersfield, Wakefield and the four West Riding County boroughs of Bradford, Leeds, Sheffield and Rotherham. Prior to 1968 each Division within the then West Riding Police had a collator’s office which was usually staffed by senior constables and a clerk. In simple terms, this office was responsible for the collation and action of intelligence linked to crime or criminals in their police area. This was a paper based system and remained for many decades, albeit force boundaries did change during that time. Each division operated a card index system that required the entering of intelligence and any subsequent searching to be done manually. Clearly this system was susceptible to mistakes caused by human error and the volume of material. In particular, the decision to record a specific piece of intelligence was the responsibility of the supervisor within the intelligence unit. This decision making process was at times subjective, meaning that there may be a lack of consistency in what and how things were recorded. During 1992 and 1993 WYP introduced a computer based intelligence recording and management system (Operational Intelligence System – OIS). This system

recorded new information electronically but did not convert historic information held on paper systems.

7.3 The problems experienced by local police stations in handling and sharing vast amounts of paper based intelligence were even greater when it came to sharing information between different police forces around the country. However, since this time, the way in which WYP receives, evaluates and actions out intelligence has undergone significant improvement and continues to change and advance in response to technology and legislation.

7.4 Operation Newgreen has investigated a significant number of intelligence and information records related to Savile. Some have been provided by other forces and organisations such as HMIC and MPS and others have been identified during the review. Each record is detailed below and the results of the investigations are contained within a separate section.

- 1958 press report of a potential court case involving Savile;
- The 1964 MPS ledger held by the MPS Paedophile Unit;
- The anonymous letter received by MPS in 1998;
- A 2003 crime report held by the MPS regarding the complaint of a Savile victim;
- Information held by Surrey Police in relation to Duncroft School during 2007-2009 based on complaints made by Savile victims;
- Information provided to Operation Yewtree by former WYP officers and staff.

**1958 press report of a potential court case involving Savile**

“A short search of the internet reveals that there are newspaper reports indicating that Savile was interviewed by West Yorkshire Police in 1958; that he was scheduled to appear in court regarding allegations that he was in some way involved in the sexual abuse of young girls”\(^{18}\)

\(^{18}\) HMIC –“Mistakes were made”
7.5 In October 2012, it was reported in the media that Savile had been investigated by the police in relation to offences of indecency involving “young girls” as early as 1958. In a journalist interview with a former employee of Savile’s club, the Mecca Locarno in Leeds, it was reported that Savile had come into the club one day and seemed to be in a low mood. When the employee spoke to other people in the club, not Savile, he was told that Savile was worried because he was up in court for “interfering with young girls”. He notes that a few days later Savile was back to his normal self. The press reports quoted the employee as saying that it was because “he had paid them (the police) off”.

7.6 Following this WYP received an enquiry from BBC Radio Leeds asking for a response in relation to the media report. Later that same day the Radio Leeds reporter recontacted WYP stating they were no longer seeking a response. Radio Leeds had conducted an interview with the former employee and he had stated that the media was incorrect in its reporting and that he had been misquoted regarding paying off the police.

7.7 Officers from the review team have spoken with the former employee who confirms that he was misquoted by the press. He stated that the incident did happen but the conversation was about Savile paying off the victims’ families and not the police. He stated that he did not suggest that Savile had paid the police off in relation to this matter.

7.8 As well as checking WYP archives, enquiries have been conducted with Her Majesty’s Court Service (HMCS) and the Crown Prosecution Service to establish if there are any records in existence relating to this matter. Due to the passage of time, any records that may have existed have now been destroyed in line with normal procedure and no further information has been located that relates to Savile being investigated and charged with any criminal offences in 1958. WYP was unable to identify any victims relating to this incident and none of the victims who have come forward since Operation Yewtree commenced outline any offending matching this allegation.
7.9 For the sake of transparency, all information and enquiries conducted by WYP in relation to the 1958 press report have been passed to the IPCC for their independent assessment and consideration.

The 1964 MPS ledger held by the MPS Paedophile Unit

“ As the police force area in which Savile principally lived throughout his life, West Yorkshire Police should have received details of:

The 1964 MPS ledger…”

7.10 An entry referring to Jimmy Savile and his links to Duncroft School was found by the MPS within a handwritten ledger held by their Paedophile Unit in 1964. This ledger documented intelligence that came into the unit. WYP have no record of this information ever being shared and the Force was not told of its existence until the 8th February 2013 by HMIC. The ledger has been examined by officers from WYP and there is no information contained within it that relates to West Yorkshire nor is there an entry regarding its communication to WYP.

The anonymous letter received by MPS in 1998

“ As the police force area in which Savile principally lived throughout his life, West Yorkshire Police should have received details of:

MPS anonymous letter…”

7.11 In 1998 the MPS received a letter from an anonymous person detailing their concerns regarding Savile’s sexual offending. This letter is now public knowledge having been published in the HMIC’s “Mistakes were made” report in March 2013. The report also explains how the MPS graded, utilised and stored this intelligence, therefore, WYP has not commented on how this

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19 HMIC – “Mistakes were made”
20 HMIC – “Mistakes were made”
21 HMIC’s review into allegations and intelligence material concerning Jimmy Savile between 1964 and 2012.
information was handled by MPS. WYP has focused on confirming how this intelligence was sent to WYP and how it was subsequently managed.

7.12 The starting point for the review team was to establish whether this information had been received by WYP and placed on any of its intelligence systems prior to the commencement of Operation Yewtree. This required not only a full audit of all WYP systems but the identification of all officers, both current and retired, who may have had knowledge of the intelligence.

7.13 In addition to this, the review team visited the MPS and spoke with the officer who it is believed created the initial intelligence report and had sent it to WYP by fax. This officer, DC X (MPS) was spoken to by WYP and states that he remembers receiving the information in 1998 and entering it into a master ledger prior to sending the report by fax to WYP. The officer also recalls that whilst working in the Clubs and Vice Team in the MPS, he received a number of other letters of a similar nature regarding Savile. He formed the view that they were from the same author due to the way they were structured and written. He submitted the letters to another unit within MPS and believes that he also submitted a number (not specified) to WYP. He cannot recall, nor has he recorded to which police area or unit he sent any intelligence or letter relating to Savile. Officers from WYP and the MPS have conducted searches to find the ledgers that DC X (MPS) refers to and check the information that was provided. They have been unsuccessful in locating these items. The MPS also conducted a separate search for the letters referred to by DC X (MPS) but they could not be located.

7.14 DC X (MPS) said he worked within the MPS Clubs and Vice Team during the late 1980`s and 1990`s and that it was common knowledge within the team that Savile was a paedophile, although this was never anything but rumour. At some point in 1989 he believes an officer from within the MPS Clubs and Vice Team was investigating Savile for an offence but he cannot recall any detail. This information has been submitted to the MPS who, with oversight from the HMIC, have investigated but been unable to find any
information or documentary evidence to support these assertions and specifically no details of an investigation into Savile in 1989. Indeed a supervisory officer from that time has been spoken to and he refutes the claim about there being common knowledge about Savile’s behaviour.

7.15 Enquiries conducted by Operation Newgreen have identified a former police officer who worked within the WYP Force Intelligence Bureau during the time the anonymous letter was received by the MPS. This officer, DC Y (WYP), worked on the specialist sexual offences intelligence desk. DC Y (WYP) was spoken to in February 2013 and recalled receiving some information from MPS relating to Savile in or around 1998 but could not remember the specific content of the report or who had sent it.

7.16 DC Y (WYP) was subsequently visited and spoken with and stated that the information may have included some discussion around conducting a joint investigation into Savile involving WYP and a number of forces, but the officer was unable to specify which forces. DC Y (WYP) said that the information received in relation to Savile had been sent by the New Scotland Yard Paedophile Unit with whom DC Y (WYP) had a good working relationship and could name a number of the officers. DC Y (WYP) could not remember which officer from the New Scotland Yard Paedophile Unit had sent the report. Other officers who worked within the New Scotland Yard Paedophile Unit and the Clubs and Vice Team have been identified and this enquiry is being progressed by the MPS.

7.17 The MPS officer, DC X (MPS), did not work within the New Scotland Yard Paedophile Unit and is not known to the WYP officer, DC Y (WYP). This brings into question whether the information being referred to by both officers is one and the same.

7.18 WYP officer, DC Y (WYP), did not record the information on any WYP computerised system but brought the information to the attention of his second Line Manager, D/Insp Z. DC Y (WYP) stated that D/Insp Z took the
information from him and when DC Y (WYP) later asked what was happening with it, DC Y (WYP) was told that it was in hand. D/Insp Z died in 2002. DC Y (WYP) stated that at the time of receiving the intelligence in 1998 he spoke with other staff who worked in the Unit but cannot provide the identity of any officer or staff that he spoke with. 24 people who worked in the unit at that time have been interviewed, including the Sergeant who was the immediate line manager of DC Y (WYP). None can recall DC Y (WYP) mentioning to them the intelligence report to which DC Y (WYP) refers. DC Y (WYP) cannot provide the identities of any officer or member of staff that he spoke with at the time. In addition to the 1998 intelligence, all of those spoken with cannot remember having seen or heard of any intelligence relating to Savile.

7.19 The information received in 1998 should have been entered on the force intelligence system by DC Y (WYP).

7.20 The circumstances surrounding this piece of intelligence and the incidents described by DC X (MPS) and DC Y (WYP) have been made subject of a referral to the IPCC.

A 2003 crime report held by the MPS regarding the complaint of a Savile victim.

“ As the police force area in which Savile principally lived throughout his life, West Yorkshire Police should have received details of:

The 2003 MPS report.”

7.21 In 2003, the MPS spoke with a woman who had been sexually assaulted at a recording of the BBC `Top of the Pops`. This information was not shared with WYP. The victim was not from the West Yorkshire area nor did it relate to offending in the West Yorkshire area.

22 HMIC –“Mistakes were made”
7.22 The contact between Surrey Police and WYP is now public knowledge having been published in both the HMIC report ‘Mistakes were made’ and the Surrey report regarding Operation Ornament. This contact relates to telephone conversations between police officers and the sending and receiving of information between 2008 and 2009 regarding the Surrey Police investigation, Operation Ornament.

7.23 WYP did receive a request from Surrey Police on 29th April 2008 regarding what information or intelligence relating to Savile was held on WYP systems. This request was made via the Force’s anti-corruption unit because the Surrey SIO wanted the investigation to remain confidential. Surrey Police confirm that they did not have any information or intelligence to suggest that there were any corruption issues in WYP, or that Savile had any relationships with WYP officers, but believed that the Anti Corruption unit was the correct route to follow when dealing with a confidential investigation. In dealing with it as a confidential investigation this information or the request would not have been known or available to the wider police force including those involved in child protection.

7.24 Surrey Police confirm the reason for the request was because Savile resided in Leeds rather than him being suspected of committing offences in West Yorkshire. WYP replied on 6th May 2008 and identified that one crime report existed and this referred to a theft of spectacles where Savile was the victim. No further contact took place between the two forces until July 2008 when the Surrey SIO, DI (A), spoke by telephone to the acting Head of WYP Child Protection Unit, T/DCI (B).

7.25 In this conversation DI (A) agreed to send an intelligence report to WYP containing the allegations made against Savile. WYP have searched its intelligence systems as well as the officers’ emails and this report can not be found. T/DCI (B) recalls the conversation but cannot recollect the information
being sent by Surrey Police. T/DCI (B) did not pursue Surrey Police to send the report. It would not be normal practice for an officer to complete an intelligence report from details provided by telephone, particularly relating to a major enquiry i.e. Operation Ornament. Neither WYP nor Surrey Police have any record on their systems of a report being sent by Surrey Police.

7.26 On 2\textsuperscript{nd} June 2009 Surrey Police sent a recorded delivery letter to Savile at his home address in Leeds asking that he make contact with them. On 3\textsuperscript{rd} June 2009 Surrey Police DI (A) contacted WYP DCI (C) who had taken over the role as head of Child Protection for WYP. DI (A) provided an update on the enquiry and confirmed that they intended to interview Savile regarding the Duncroft School allegations.

7.27 It is documented that WYP offered officer support if Savile was to be interviewed in West Yorkshire.

7.28 On the 10\textsuperscript{th} June 2009 DI (A) re-contacted DCI (C) and said that on 8\textsuperscript{th} June 2009 an Inspector from WYP, Insp (A), had contacted Surrey police, control room to control room, on behalf of Savile as Savile had lost the investigating officer’s contact details. DI(A) also informed DCI (C) that during the conversation with the Surrey Police control room Inspector, Insp (A) had stated that he was a personal friend of Savile and also that “Jimmy gets so many of these type of complaints”. Insp (A) provided a contact number to Surrey Police for Savile so that they could arrange their interview with Savile as outlined in their letter to Savile. This was done by Insp (A) on WYP recorded communications systems but due to the passage of time the recording has now been destroyed in line with force policy at that time.

7.29 DI (A) also advised DCI (C) that on initial contact, Savile had told them there was a West Yorkshire Inspector who normally deals with this sort of thing. DI (A) also agreed to send an intelligence report containing the details of the Savile investigation. This report was received by WYP and it contained details of the offences at Duncroft School and Surrey Police’s intention to interview Savile. This report was put on to the WYP computerised intelligence
system. However, the report was recorded on the system in such a manner that access to the information was restricted. Consequently, it was not shared across departments. Storing information in this manner is not unusual as information at times quite rightly has to be protected to ensure the safety of the person providing it and to restrict revealing operational activity that may compromise an investigation if it were to fall into the wrong hands; this is in line with legislation, force and national policy. The decision to protect it was made by a supervisor within the Force Intelligence Unit in line with correct force procedures to ensure that the Surrey investigation was not compromised. Although this information was protected, had a search been done it would have been easily located. The detail within the report could then have been obtained if requested via a simple, widely used force procedure.

7.30 WYP did not receive a closing report from Surrey Police at the end of their investigation.

7.31 The contact between WYP and Surrey Police, involving several officers is now subject of a voluntary referral to the IPCC.

Information provided to Operation Yewtree by former WYP officers and staff.

“Two former West Yorkshire officers and a relative of a West Yorkshire officer came forward stating that they had been aware of concerns regarding Savile’s contact with young girls.”

7.32 As the national lead for the investigation in to Savile’s offending, the MPS (Operation Yewtree) has received information from retired police officers and their families relating to Savile. One retired WYP officer provided a number of different pieces of information relating to Savile.

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23 HMIC – “Mistakes were made”
In particular, the officer described how whilst on duty, Savile was seen jogging in Roundhay Park. The officer said “hello” but he did not respond as he seemed to be angry. A short time later the officer spoke to a female who the officer believed worked in the café in Roundhay Park and appeared upset. She stated that Savile was a “horrible man” and she wished he would not come in to the café. At no time did she make an allegation of sexual assault or any other crime to the officer. The review team have conducted extensive enquiries to obtain further information about this incident. In doing so, the family that owned the café have been interviewed together with the three females that have been identified as having worked or spent time at the café during this period. Both the owners and the females have said that not only did Savile attend the café on a regular basis, but that they became good friends with Savile. All have independently stated that at no time was Savile ever inappropriate towards them, in either words or actions. Savile took the females to London for the filming of Top of the Pops and also Jim’ll Fix It. They describe him being like an uncle and acting like a gentleman. The only instance of police attendance at the café that the owner could recall was one occasion where a female officer attended to speak to them about a customer having been short changed. Savile was present in the rear of the shop having a coffee with the staff. The police officer gave advice in relation to the customer and left.

The review team has also spoken to 21 former colleagues of the officer. None have any recollection of the incident involving Savile and the female at the café. All the additional pieces of information that the officer provided, which mainly related to colleagues having possible knowledge of Savile, have been extensively investigated. None of the officer’s former colleagues have any knowledge of Savile’s offending prior to the broadcast of the ‘Exposure’ documentary.

The force has a concern that this incident was referred to in the HMIC report as a victim attempting to report an offence committed by Savile prior to the start of Operation Yewtree. This is factually incorrect and the HMIC have
been informed. The officer who supplied the original details confirms that an allegation was not made to them at the time or subsequently.

7.36 A retired senior officer contacted Operation Yewtree to inform them that he had been invited to attend the FMC on one occasion but had declined the offer. Information was also provided that Savile had offered the use of his flat to support the policing operation around the Robbie Williams concert in 2006. This officer was revisited and confirmed that this was the extent of their knowledge of Savile. Savile’s flat was never used to support any WYP operations.

7.37 Another retired officer contacted Operation Yewtree to inform them that in the early 1980’s there were rumours that Savile was a “pervert”. When visited, the officer was unable to provide any more detail regarding where the rumours had emanated from.

7.38 Contact was received from a member of the public and a retired police officer to say that in the early 1960’s there were rumours circulating at his place of work, that Savile took young girls to his barge in Leeds for parties. Upon being further interviewed, they were unable to provide any further information as to the provenance of the rumours. Although they believed that Savile did have a barge in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, they were unable to provide any further information or identify the source of the rumours.

7.39 WYP can find no record of any information or intelligence to support these allegations however, this information has come from a retired police officer who was clearly aware of the rumours at the time and as such WYP have voluntarily referred this matter to the IPCC to allow an independent overview and scrutiny of the circumstances.

7.40 A member of the public informed Operation Yewtree that two of their estranged partners had been aware of Savile’s sexual abuse activities. One was alleged to have heard accounts of his sexual abuse activities in the course of their role as a probation officer. The other was alleged to have
visited Savile’s flat in their role as a teacher to collect a female truant. Both former partners were visited and independently both denied either having any knowledge of the incidents or of having any contact with Savile. One of them described the reporting person as having a “vivid imagination”.

7.41 The review team made an appeal for staff to contact them with any information or intelligence they were aware of that related to Savile. 35 members of WYP responded and this resulted in the identification of two new victims of sexual assault and eleven lines of enquiry to pursue relating to instances where there had possibly been interaction between WYP and Savile.

7.42 During the course of their review, officers from Operation Newgreen visited a storage facility which holds some of Savile’s personal possessions. Within the collection were items of memorabilia and photographs. Prior to WYP attending, officers from Operation Yewtree had also carried out this task and seized a number of personal diaries written by Savile. Nothing additional was found amongst these possessions that was relevant to any investigation or review into Savile.

7.43 WYP has examined the diaries. The entries in the diaries consist of Savile’s experiences in his daily life and they are public knowledge as they are included in his autobiographies24. Some of the stories relate to personal relationships or contact with Police officers. One of the entries refers to a retired Chief Superintendent in the Greater Manchester Police and a conversation they held about a club that Savile attended which potentially held illegal gaming machines.

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7.44 A further entry refers to a girl who is described as an `absconder` whilst Savile was the owner of a club in Leeds. Here Savile describes how a female police officer attended the club with a photograph of the girl in question and asked for Savile to contact the Police should the girl be seen in the premises. Savile writes that he responded by stating that he would return the girl but keep her all night first as a reward.

7.45 Savile then writes that the girl does go into the club and he tries to advise her about running away. The girl agreed to stop running away if she was allowed to stay at the dance and go home with Savile. Savile writes that he“hands the girl over at 11.30am the next day” and implies that the police do not challenge him because of the relationship he has with them. This entry is not dated and Savile gives no indication who the officer is or which Police station he refers to. No victim has come forward in relation to this incident.

7.46 WYP does not have any records which support this information. In light of this, WYP have voluntarily referred this matter to the IPCC to allow an independent overview and scrutiny of the circumstances.

7.47 The review team have identified and spoken to an officer who worked in Leeds during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. He confirms accompanying a member of the Police Women’s Unit\textsuperscript{25} to Savile’s flat on St. Johns Terrace Leeds and also to his club on Cross Mill Hill Leeds, looking for a female reported missing by her parents. He cannot remember the female police officer’s name.

7.48 The retired officer said this was a regular enquiry by the Police Women’s Unit but only because at that time, late 60’s - early 70’s, Savile’s club was the place to be seen, and it was a common occurrence for girls to stay later than they should.

He stated that he never found anyone at Savile’s flat, and the girls who apparently frequented the club were not children as such, but teenagers.

\textsuperscript{25} Police Women’s Unit: Female only unit that dealt with incidents involving women and children.
around 16/17 years old and upwards. He stated that at that time there weren’t many places for the young to go, so Savile’s club was an obvious starting point for missing from home enquiries. At this time Savile would have been in his mid 40’s and beginning to become an established celebrity.

7.49 He had no knowledge of why the officer wanted to visit Savile’s flat, other than as a matter of routine, and had not heard any rumours about Savile, although he thought Savile was a “weirdo” because he used to dye his hair in garish colours.

7.50 During interviews with former members of the Leeds Vice Squad, the enquiry team spoke with a retired officer who had worked in the unit during the early 1980’s who believed that the unit had conducted an investigation into Savile which involved allegations of indecent assault on two girls. The officer said that he was not involved in the investigation himself, so had no direct knowledge, and provided the names of the other officers that worked in the unit at that time. All those people that the officer has named that are still living have been traced and spoken with, together with other people not named by the retired officer but identified as a result of these enquiries made in relation to the incident and none recall an investigation into Savile. There is no record on any WYP systems of this investigation taking place.

7.51 WYP can find no record of any information or intelligence to support this information. However, this information has come from a retired police officer who was clear in his assertion that an investigation was conducted into Savile. As such, WYP have voluntarily referred this matter to the IPCC to allow an independent overview and scrutiny of the circumstances.
8. Friday Morning Club (FMC)

“Savile’s assertion that he met a “collection of senior police officers” socially to whom he gave any letters that made allegations against him”\textsuperscript{26}

8.1 Since October 2012 there has been significant media comment and conjecture around the activity of what has become known as the “Friday Morning Club”, a regular meeting at Savile’s home address in Leeds.

8.2 Much of the conjecture has been fuelled by Savile himself who, in his interview with Surrey Police in 2009, informed officers that he socialised with “senior police people” in Leeds, who attended his home address and that he gave them all his “weirdo” letters.

8.3 A key objective of Operation Newgreen was to test the veracity of these comments and to establish what exactly the FMC was, who attended, what happened when they met and whether any WYP officer was professionally compromised by Savile or anyone else.

8.4 Rather than rely on the accounts provided by the police officers due to their perceived close relationship with Savile, the review placed a great emphasis on identifying all of the people who attended the FMC. The intention was to bring a degree of independence to this important issue and once and for all establish what actually happened at the FMC.

8.5 During the initial review in December 2012, a serving officer, Sergeant (B) was spoken with and stated that he had first met Savile whilst engaged on his duties as a community officer covering the area where Savile lived. He was invited by Savile for a coffee at his flat and accepted the invitation. At the time the force was encouraging officers to have more interaction with the community and so it was not irregular or inappropriate to accept. From then

\textsuperscript{26} HMIC –“Mistakes were made”
on he would often call at Savile’s on a Friday Morning when other friends of Savile would also be present. On occasions, Savile was not present and so he would have a cup of tea with Savile’s cleaner.

8.6 Sergeant (B) said that it was a social gathering of Savile’s friends – some old school friends and others whom he had met and formed a friendship with during his lifetime in Leeds - with attendees drinking tea and coffee and chatting about current affairs. As it tended to be the same people who attended, Sergeant (B) termed the group the “Friday Morning Club”. Sergeant (B) said nothing occurred at the FMC that compromised his position as a serving WYP Officer.

8.7 The preliminary enquiries did not indicate any inappropriate conduct or behaviour by WYP officers. This was detailed in a report which was provided to HMIC on the 18th December 2012.

8.8 After the initial review of the FMC, further information became available to WYP from Surrey Police in January 2013. This stated that Savile, during his police interview in October 2009, had mentioned police officers attending his home to drink tea.

8.9 He described them as “senior police people” and said he received “weirdo” letters on a regular basis and these were handed to the police officers during the meetings at his home. Savile went onto say the officers read the letters and then either destroyed them or kept them for a short time in case anything happened to him.

8.10 During the interview Savile named a then serving West Yorkshire Police Inspector as being one of those that attended his home address. The comments made by Savile regarding the officers and the letters were not explored further or challenged by the interviewing officers from Surrey Police and this information was not shared with WYP until after Savile’s death, presenting little if any opportunity to explore what was said and the context of the comments made.
8.11 The enquiry has identified that over the two decades Savile held his Friday morning meetings that up to eight police officers have attended over different periods of time. All of the officers who are known to have attended have been interviewed by the review team. The majority have said they were invited by Inspector (A), who Savile refers to in his interview with Surrey Police, or Sergeant (B). Four of the officers attended on one occasion only, but four of the officers attended on a regular basis over a number of years.

8.12 All of the officers spoken to describe the visit to Savile’s home as nothing more than a short social gathering where people would chat and drink tea. They said that there would be a mixture of people present, the majority being Savile’s friends.

8.13 After extensive enquiries the review team identified a number of people who regularly attended at Savile’s on Friday mornings. They came from a wide range of backgrounds and included Savile’s childhood friends, his hairdresser, a retired pharmacist and the pharmacist’s adult son, a local shop owner, a retired dentist, Savile’s Personal Assistant and his cleaner.

8.14 All were spoken to and they have described the FMC in exactly the same terms as the police officers who had attended. In fact, some have commented on how professionally the police officers conducted themselves whilst at Savile’s home.

8.15 On one occasion two employees of Radio Leeds attended to record an interview with Savile. They both describe seeing four or five 50 – 60 year old men drinking coffee and eating cakes.

8.16 A number of the officers spoken to do remember him, occasionally reading out the type of letters that Savile would later describe as “weirdo” letters in his interview with Surrey police in 2009. Apart from one occasion, which is detailed below, they have all described the letters as ‘begging letters’ or requests for a charitable donation from Savile. They are adamant that the
letters they saw did not involve any accusations of sexual assault or any other crime committed by Savile and the letters remained with him.

8.17 During interviews with those who attended the FMC, all were asked about letters that Savile received and whether any were ever passed to the police officers that were present. Nobody was able to recall any letters being passed to the officers present at the FMC. However, Inspector (A) did recall that on one occasion 6-7 years ago, Savile did receive a letter that was more sinister than the usual begging letters or requests for support. He was unable to provide any detail but did say that it seemed to cause Savile more concern than the usual letters he received.

8.18 Inspector (A) recalled that this letter contained threats of violence but nothing of a criminal or sexual nature and when Savile showed this to the FMC, the advice was to preserve the letter for fingerprints and to involve the police. Inspector (A) named who he thought was the local Detective Chief Inspector at the time and believed he was informed about it by one of the other police officers present. He did not know what happened to the letter. None of the other police officers present recall notifying the local DCI about a letter, although one does recall a conversation on the topic.

8.19 The now retired DCI has been interviewed. He has no knowledge of investigating or being made aware of any letter relating to Savile. However, he does recall attending at Savile’s flat on one occasion at the request of the local Divisional Commander to provide some crime prevention advice to Savile after he had expressed concern for his safety. Extensive enquiries have been conducted to establish if this is one and the same incident, but no other people have any recollection of the matter. Other serving DCI’s around this period of time were also spoken with about this incident. None had any knowledge of the incident or ever had any dealings with Savile.

8.20 Enquiries have been conducted to establish whether any letters addressed to Savile were ever subject to forensic examination. There is no
record of any letter coming into possession of either the police or Forensic Science Service that relates to Savile.

8.21 Concerns have been expressed in relation to the FMC; the enquiry has found no evidence to support these concerns. In spite of the rumour and speculation surrounding this meeting, no evidence has been found of any police impropriety or misconduct.

8.22 The enquiry has shown that the FMC was an occasional meeting of a group of people to have coffee, tea and a chat about current affairs or Savile’s celebrity tales at Savile’s home address.

8.23 This review has spoken to everybody known to have either attended the FMC or knew of its existence which involved interviewing over 40 people. Those interviewed include police officers, retired police officers, friends, associates and employees of Savile, both male and female.

8.24 For the sake of transparency, all information and enquiries conducted by WYP in relation to the Friday Morning Club has been passed to the IPCC for their independent assessment and consideration as to whether they share the conclusion of WYP.
9. Savile’s link to The Yorkshire Ripper Enquiry

9.1 The investigation into the murders and attacks committed by Peter Sutcliffe between 1976 and 1981 remains one of the largest and most complex enquiries in the history of British Policing. During the course of the 5 year enquiry a total of 151,000 `actions` were raised, 158,000 vehicle enquiries were conducted and 31,000 statements were obtained from witnesses. Even with the data management technology available today, an enquiry on this scale presents a significant challenge. When put into the context of the period and considering that all information was recorded, logged and managed by way of paper based systems, the scale and complexity of the investigation is almost impossible to fully appreciate.

9.2 Against this background, WYP have made enquiries to establish whether Savile was a person of interest to this enquiry, whether any intelligence relating to him was available to the enquiry team, whether any intelligence relating to him was gathered by the enquiry team and, if intelligence did exist, should it have entered into the police intelligence system.

9.3 Following the conviction of Peter Sutcliffe on the 22nd May 1981, the murder investigation papers were boxed and placed into storage within the WYP estate.

9.4 On the 29th July 1982, the then Assistant Chief Constable (Crime) authorised the destruction of large volumes of papers relating to the Yorkshire Ripper investigation including material such as anonymous letters and house to house forms. The case file and evidence relating to Peter Sutcliffe and the enquiry nominal index card system were all retained. All documentation relating to large major enquiries is constantly reviewed and weeded in line with policy, procedure and legislation relevant at that particular time. The retention and destruction of these records was properly reviewed, considered and recorded by the relevant senior police officer with responsibility and oversight for serious crime.
What now remains are 198 boxes containing key exhibits, the prosecution file and the list of people spoken to.

9.5 The Yorkshire Ripper Investigation was the biggest enquiry ever conducted by West Yorkshire Police. Over the five year period thousands of men were spoken to and their details recorded on paper index cards. Searches of the paperwork relating to the investigation have identified four index cards relating to Savile. They contain scant information and do not indicate whether Savile was a “person of interest” to the enquiry team. The information held was his name, date of birth, home address and various reference numbers. It was not possible to establish the relevance of the reference numbers as a large proportion of the investigation paperwork had been destroyed in the 1980’s as outlined at 9.4.

9.6 One card does make reference to Savile offering his services as an intermediary for the police, should the “Ripper” wish to make contact.

9.7 A retired senior officer who worked on the investigation was spoken to and he remembered Savile’s name being mentioned during a meeting with fellow senior officers. He was unable to provide any more detail as to why he was mentioned and what links if any Savile had to the Ripper enquiry. The enquiry team spoke to several other officers who were part of the Ripper enquiry team, including those officers that worked on the Leeds side of the investigation and they had no knowledge of Savile being part of that enquiry.
10 Conclusion and Actions

10.1 Since October 2012, when the ‘Exposure’ documentary was broadcast, the main focus for WYP has been on supporting Savile’s victims and pursuing any other offenders who were still alive. However the review and investigation conducted by Operation Newgreen has also been to reflect upon Savile’s history of offending and his contact with WYP; to understand the mistakes that were made, to learn the lessons from those mistakes and act upon the recommendations arising from the review. WYP has been absolutely committed to do this to prevent such mistakes happening again.

10.3 The review was commissioned with the overarching aim of identifying any historic opportunities whereby WYP could have prevented Savile’s offending. Of equal importance, was the need to identify what lessons could be learned to prevent another person like Savile using their public persona to hide their offending and avoid capture.

10.4 The review team gained access to all known information and intelligence that existed within WYP that related in any way to Savile. It is important to note that structures and processes have already changed and new technology has been introduced but the consequence of this is that information has been weeded in line with both WYP protocols and legal requirements.

10.5 The review team found during interviews that recollections of events were often vague and incomplete. It was felt that this was not due to people being obstructive, but simply a consequence of the passage of time. This was compounded by the fact that certain enquiries could not be fully completed due to some of the key witnesses having passed away since their retirement.
10.6 Every effort has been made to encourage both current and retired staff to come forward with any information or knowledge relating to Savile, no matter how seemingly insignificant.

10.7 A major challenge faced by the review team was to extract fact from rumour and speculation. All aspects have been thoroughly investigated and the facts have been established but in some instances the passage of time, changes in the recording, handling and weeding of information and the death of people relevant to establishing the facts, WYP has been unable to fully establish all the facts.

10.8 Savile was a national celebrity who was seen by most of the public as a man who did good work. As he lived in Leeds for most of his life WYP used his celebrity status to support a number of crime prevention campaigns and appeals - a situation that is common with both public and private organisations. The review team are satisfied that the work undertaken by Savile in support of local and force campaigns and events was entirely appropriate at the time. The review team have concerns regarding the absence of a process to secure Savile’s services for some of these events and also the over reliance on personal friendships that developed between Savile and some officers over a number of years to secure that support.

10.9 Of greater concern is that even after the Force received the request from Surrey Police in 2007 to check what records WYP held that related to Savile in relation to their investigation at Duncroft School, WYP continued to use him as part of local crime prevention campaigns. The reason for this was that the information was not shared across departments, there was no recognition of the impact of this information and no checks were made on intelligence systems in securing Savile’s services.
Action 1.

WYP will develop its current policy to ensure that associations and relationships with high profile individuals receive the same level of scrutiny and management as relationships with other individuals to ensure effective safeguarding measures are in place to protect the public and maintain public confidence.

10.10 In relation to Savile’s victims, the review team conducted extensive enquires to establish if any allegation of sexual abuse by Savile had been reported to WYP during his life time. Although rumours did exist of previous investigations taking place into allegations made against Savile, when these were explored they were found to be without any foundation. Despite numerous interviews, system searches and enquiries with other agencies, the review team found no evidence of any previous allegations being made to WYP against Savile, or of any investigations being conducted. The force does recognise that some people may have difficulty in reconciling this fact; indeed WYP has difficulty in reconciling this, as since October 2012, 68 victims have come forward to report Savile’s abuse in the West Yorkshire area. That said none of the victims currently identified had previously reported their abuse to WYP and we are committed to fully understanding this and learning the lessons. WYP will work with the NSPCC to understand and encourage victims to come forward.

Action 2

WYP will continue to work with Victims of non-recent sexual abuse and support organisations to gain a better understanding of why Savile’s victims did not report his crimes to WYP.
10.11 Against a backdrop of collective failings across the police service in relation to how intelligence about Savile was managed and shared between forces, the review team examined the effectiveness of WYP intelligence process over the years.

10.12 The review did find that mistakes were made in how WYP recorded and handled some intelligence relating to Savile. Prior to the introduction of an electronic intelligence management system, these mistakes could be attributed to an archaic paper based system, a lack of personal responsibility by officers, convoluted policing structures and subjective assessments of what was relevant, including if and how it would be recorded. By 1998 process reviews, legislation, new technology and performance management have all been introduced to equip WYP to effectively and robustly manage its intelligence and information. However problems still occurred in how WYP dealt with the anonymous letter relating to Savile forwarded by MPS in 1998. The circumstances of this are currently subject of a voluntary IPCC referral.

Action 3

WYP will continue to ensure that it is compliant with the National Intelligence Model in relation to the recording, classification and dissemination of intelligence that may relate to a high profile individual.
**Action 4**

WYP will develop a process to ensure that when important information or intelligence is received verbally it is assessed and a record is made on the intelligence systems.

**Action 5**

WYP will review current training programmes for those engaged in research and analysis.

10.13 The meetings held at Savile’s home on Friday mornings had been portrayed by some, as Savile using his friendship with police officers to provide him with protection from allegations of sexual abuse. WYP recognised the seriousness of this suggestion and placed great emphasis on establishing the truth of what actually took place.

10.14 No evidence has been found to conclude that there was any impropriety or misconduct in relation to the FMC.

10.15 All of those people spoken to who had knowledge of the Friday Morning Club described it as of a ‘coffee morning’. Non police attendees commented on how professionally the police officers who had attended Savile’s home conducted themselves.

10.16 Savile had friends who were police officers, but he also had friends that were solicitors, doctors and many other professions. All enquiries have shown that Savile was able to hide his offending from those he came into contact with and who probably thought that they knew him well. There is no evidence that he was protected from arrest or prosecution for any offences as a result of his relationship with WYP, or individual friendships with officers.
10.17 It has been difficult, due to what is now known of Jimmy Savile to accurately assess the appropriateness of his relationship with WYP. This relationship spanned many decades and took place at a time when he was a highly respected celebrity who was recognised for his charity work. The force accepts that it needs to review how it manages its relationships with high profile individuals to ensure appropriate safeguards are in place for the protection of the public and WYP.

10.18 Many of the operational issues covered in this report date back many years and the Force has moved forward in rectifying those matters that may have contributed to the failings outlined. The Force now has in place dedicated teams with specialist skills to investigate sexual offences, to support victims and protect vulnerable people including Operation Topaz a dedicated rape investigation unit and the District Adult and Child Safeguarding Units. In addition the Force has developed close relationships with both statutory and voluntary partners to support the victims of sexual violence and is progressing Multi Agency Safeguarding Hubs to provide a joined up, co-ordinated response to the victims of sexual violence.

10.19 The force has made many improvements in how it deals with sexual violence and is absolutely committed to learn the lessons from Operation Newgreen and further improve how it deals with victims of sexual violence. Improvements brought about by not only changes in structures and processes, but more importantly a real change in its culture and policing approach during the past 20 years. WYP will continue to look for ways to work in partnership with other agencies to encourage reporting and then support victims of recent and non-recent sexual violence.

WYP are committed to ensuring that the lessons learned as a result of this investigation are fully implemented.

1. WYP will develop its current policy to ensure that associations and relationships with high profile individuals receive the same level of scrutiny and management as relationships with other individuals to ensure effective safeguarding measures are in place to protect the public and maintain public confidence.

2. WYP will continue to work with Victims of recent and non-recent sexual abuse and support organisations to gain a better understanding of why Savile’s victims did not report their abuse to WYP.

3. WYP will continue to ensure that it is compliant with the National Intelligence model in relation to the recording, classification and dissemination of intelligence that may relate to a high profile individual.

4. WYP will develop a process to ensure that when important information or intelligence is received verbally it is assessed and a record is made on the intelligence systems.

5. WYP will review current training programmes for those engaged in research and analysis to ensure that a profile of sexual violence and sexual offenders is maintained in West Yorkshire.
Appendix A

To assist in the interpretation of the diagrams, West Yorkshire Police is divided into eight policing areas. For administration purposes, each area has a divisional “identifier” which is a two letter code.

The areas and identifiers are listed in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Identifier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North West Leeds (NWL)</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East Leeds (NEL)</td>
<td>BA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City and Holbeck (C&amp;H)</td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakefield</td>
<td>DA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirklees</td>
<td>EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calderdale</td>
<td>FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford South</td>
<td>GA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airedale and North Bradford (ANB)</td>
<td>HA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main location of Savile's offending within West Yorkshire is Leeds (AA/BA/CA) with 72 of the 76 crimes recorded in that location

(Fig 1)
The predominant age range of the victims is between 14 and 17, with 45 % of the recorded crimes being recorded with victims from that age group.

Fig 2

**Predominant Age of Victim (child/adult %)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 to 9</td>
<td>9 - (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 13</td>
<td>9 - (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 to 17</td>
<td>30 - (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18+</td>
<td>20 - (29%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The youngest victim was 5 years old at the time of the offence, the eldest was 45 years.

The majority of the offences were committed against females.

Fig 3

**Victim Gender Profile**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>49 - (72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>19 - (28%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The main decades when the offences were committed were in the 1960’s and 1970’s when Savile was aged between 34 and 54.

Fig 4

The decades of the 1960’s and 1970’s account for 83 % of the offences recorded.

Fig 5
The classification of offences reported range from rape to common assault.
To assist in the interpretation of fig.6, the below is an explanation of the listed Offences:

- **Rape**: Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 makes it an offence for a person intentionally to penetrate with his penis the vagina, anus or mouth of another person without that person's consent, if he does not reasonably believe that the other person consents.

- **Sexual assault**: Section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 makes it an offence for a person intentionally to touch sexually another person without that person's consent, if they do not reasonably believe the other person consents.

- **Sexual activity with a child under 13**: Section 7 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 makes it an offence for a person to touch sexually a child under the age of 13.

**Sexual activity with a child**: Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 makes it an offence for a person aged 18 or over to intentionally engage in sexual touching of a child under 16. Where the child is aged 13, 14 or 15, the prosecution must prove that the defendant did not reasonably believe that the child was 16 or over.

- **Outrage public decency**: ‘Outraging public decency’ is one of very few common law offences remaining in the criminal justice system:

  "It is an offence to commit an act of a lewd, obscene and disgusting nature, which is capable of outraging public decency, in a public place where at least two members of the public could have witnessed it”.

- **Exposure**: Section 66 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 makes it an offence for a person intentionally to expose his genitals where he intends that someone will see them and be caused alarm or distress.
This offence can be committed by a male or female against a male or female.

Rape accounts for 10% of the reported crime with 8 offences. There are 8 offences of sexual activity with a child under 13 and 3 offences of sexual activity with a child aged between 13 and 15yrs. The majority of the offences are that of sexual assault on a female with 45 offences (59.2%).